Nudging towards a healthier life? Conceptualising the role of health apps and wearables between empowerment and manipulation by Maier-Rigaud, Remi & Böning, Sarah-Lena
www.ssoar.info
Nudging towards a healthier life? Conceptualising
the role of health apps and wearables between
empowerment and manipulation
Maier-Rigaud, Remi; Böning, Sarah-Lena
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Konferenzbeitrag / conference paper
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Maier-Rigaud, R., & Böning, S.-L. (2017). Nudging towards a healthier life? Conceptualising the role of health
apps and wearables between empowerment and manipulation. In C. Bala, & W. Schuldzinski (Eds.), The 21st
Century Consumer: Vulnerable, Responsible, Transparent? ; Proceedings of the International Conference on
Consumer Research (ICCR) 2016 (pp. 127-142). Düsseldorf: Verbraucherzentrale Nordrhein-Westfalen e.V. https://
doi.org/10.15501/978-3-86336-918-7_11
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY Lizenz (Namensnennung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY Licence
(Attribution). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Nudging towards a healthier life?
Conceptualising the role of health apps and wearables 
 between empowerment and manipulation
Prof. Dr Remi Maier-Rigaud (Germany)| Rhein-Main University of Applied 
Sciences, Wiesbaden
Sarah-Lena Böning (Germany) | University of Cologne
DOI 10.15501/978-3-86336-918-7_11
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0  Inter national License 
| CC BY 4.0 
License Deed | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ 
Legal Code | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode
128 Remi Maier-Rigaud and Sarah-Lena Böning
What once has been thought, cannot be taken back.
 (Friedrich Dürrenmatt, The Physicists)
In Dürrenmatts play, the physicist Möbius has discovered the world formula 
and is afraid of its destructive potential, which poses a threat to global secu-
rity. In order to ensure that his dismal discovery will not become harmful, he 
checks into a lunatic asylum. Tragically, his plan fails and his discovery falls 
into the wrong hands, which leads him to resignation and to the above-quoted 
insight. The lesson to be drawn from this play is that technological innovations 
have a huge influence on individual and social behaviour and that we cannot 
stop new technology from being used. However, we have the possibility to 
establish forms of public governance, ensuring that innovation works for the 
individual and common good. Health apps and wearables may appear to be 
a comparatively minor innovation, but they have the potential to change our 
society significantly, and the widespread use of this technology reminds us 
that it is high-time to analyse its potential, ranging from empowerment to the 
manipulation of users.
Starting from the interpretation that health apps are nudges that change the 
contexts in which users make health-related decisions, we address the ques-
tion of whether consumers feel in control of these nudges. Are health apps 
controlling consumers according to underlying economic interests, or are apps 
empowering users by providing a self-correction tool promoting human agen-
cy and genuine freedom of lifestyle choice (Sunstein 2015)? Are they appro-
priate tools for nudging users towards healthier lifestyles, or is a differential 
consumer protection strategy required?
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1 Libertarian paternalism: nudging 
 consumers through health apps?
1.1 Defining libertarian paternalism
Economic theory acknowledges that the homo oeconomicus, or rational actor 
model, with the underlying assumptions of rationality, stable preferences and 
utility maximisation, is only a reference model for analytical purposes. Real 
human behaviour is different in many respects, as social psychology and soci-
ology shows in different contexts. Moreover, empirical evidence of systematic 
divergence from the homo oeconomicus is provided by behavioural econom-
ics (for example: Shafir 2013; Schulz/Thöni 2013). The policy implications of 
these insights are new forms of governance that take real human behaviour 
into account. The most influential behaviourally informed approach to the reg-
ulation of human behaviour is libertarian paternalism. Paternalism, because it 
is based on behavioural insights, concludes that humans need more guidance 
than the rational actor model would prescribe. Still, this approach is liber-
tarian in the sense that it endorses normative individualism. Ultimately, the 
individual should still be in the driver’s seat, making decisions. Libertarian 
paternalism only alters the context of decision-making; it builds entire choice 
architectures in order to steer those individuals who lack time, information or 
cognitive capacity towards making good choices. In the words of the fathers of 
this new movement of libertarian paternalism, choice architects are ‘self-con-
sciously attempting to move people in directions that will make their lives bet-
ter’ (Thaler and Sunstein 2008, 6). To this end, they use nudges, which they 
define as ‘any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behaviour 
in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing 
their economic incentives’ (Thaler and Sunstein 2008, 6). This defines nudging 
as a type of regulation by contrasting it with other forms of regulation that are 
coercive, such as laws prohibiting drugs or involving financial (dis-)incentives, 
for example, getting a parking ticket. These latter forms of regulation are not 
nudges, but they are frequently discussed in the context of nudges, because 
they constitute regulatory alternatives. Regulation is not necessarily public 
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regulation. The private and the public sector can use nudging, and frequently 
decisions are made against the background of various overlapping or simulta-
neous nudges that are in place.
A prominent, highly relevant example of a choice architecture in the context 
of consumer protection is the revised EU tobacco directive, according to which 
the harmful effects of smoking have to be visualised on the cigarette packs 
according to standardised formats (Böning and Maier-Rigaud 2016, 253–254). 
Hence, libertarian paternalism uses expert knowledge to build choice archi-
tectures that make individual consumer choices easier, allowing for short-
cuts that relieve individuals from complex information-gathering and deci-
sion-making processes, but ultimately retaining individual freedom of choice. 
This is achieved by a mere alteration of choice contexts, instead of addressing 
choices directly. Therefore, this kind of intervention is also described as soft 
paternalism, contrasting the concept with traditional paternalism based on 
commands and prohibition.
1.2 Critical aspects of the nudging controversy
The general discussion about nudging and libertarian paternalism is extreme-
ly controversial, not least because of the important public policy implications 
it carries. Two pivotal aspects are, whether nudges are manipulative and who 
is legitimately allowed to nudge.
Despite the labelling of nudging as a softer form of paternalism, some au-
thors see a danger that nudges intentionally manipulate decision-making in 
a non-transparent fashion (e.g. Schnellenbach 2014, 781), and they therefore 
prefer classic forms of paternalism. Ultimately, the issue of manipulation is 
contingent upon the definition of manipulation (Drerup and Dessauer 2016, 
374). Transparency is certainly a key element of democratic public govern-
ance; however, it is also clear that there is no such thing as a real world choice 
without any choice architecture or institutional arrangements structuring or 
nudging individual behaviour (Sunstein 2014, 584; Drerup and Dessauer 2016, 
377). Rather, the real world is characterised by an omnipresence of forms of 
hard paternalism that should be viewed as a reference point when discuss-
ing regulatory interventions (Funk 2014, 791). Against this background, we 
can conclude that there is certainly a continuum of more or less manipulative 
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nudges (Drerup and Dessauer 2016, 391), and that nudges, like any regulatory 
intervention, require transparent justification. This leads to the second main 
criticism discussing the legitimacy of choice architects.
A fundamental critique of nudging relates to the question of who the legitimate 
choice architects are and how they know what is best for consumers. In the 
context of health, this is particularly controversial, as medical evidence and 
social norms both play an important role. Ultimately, it is not a viable solution 
to refrain from building public choice architectures, because this would simply 
strengthen the status quo (Schmidt 2014, 344). Indeed, as mentioned above, 
the structuration of our decision-making environment is omnipresent and part-
ly manipulative if we think, for example, about marketing strategies. The pri-
vate sector is much less hesitant about using nudges. Referring to the public 
choice literature, one could argue that nudges should not be used by the state, 
because public institutions may not use them in a benevolent way (Rebonato 
2014, 389–390). However, abuse is always a risk that comes with governance 
tools and not an argument against the tools per se; rather, it is an argument 
for the division of power and a carefully designed democratic political system. 
Furthermore, as Drerup and Dessauer (2016, 377–379) point out, a problematic 
double standard is applied by many critics of nudging, showing more confi-
dence in nudges used by a profit-oriented private sector than in nudges used 
by public policy. This contrasts with the attitudes of consumers towards nudg-
ing in the realm of health behaviour: there is a consensus among consumers 
to approve nudges that promote the health and well-being of consumers and 
balancing opposed efforts by profit-oriented companies (Junghans, Cheung, 
and De Ridder 2015, 10).
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2 Nudging through health apps
2.1 Promoting health and well-being through health apps
One possibility in terms of promoting health and well-being are health apps—
software applications for smartphones and tablets changing those small de-
vices into special tools for health, wellness, fitness and medical purposes 
(Albrecht 2016, 15). Offering features such as self-tracking and displaying of 
health outcomes, they change the context in which users make health-related 
decisions, probably motivating them to improve the outcomes displayed by 
their app.
Health apps belong to the ‘mHealth’ (mobile health) field, which is a—not yet 
clearly defined—component of eHealth and can be understood as ‘medical and 
public health practice supported by mobile devices, such as mobile phones, 
patient monitoring devices, personal digital assistants (PDAs), and other wire-
less devices’ (Albrecht 2016, 14; Kay, Santos, and Takane 2011, 6). To define 
health apps, Albrecht et al. (2015) consult the WHO’s definition of health as ‘a 
state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the 
absence of disease or infirmity’ (WHO, 1946). According to this definition, apps 
intending to positively influence physical, mental and social well-being can 
be defined as ‘health apps’. Health apps that specifically intend diagnostic 
or therapeutic purposes, and thereby ‘cover key areas of medicine’, should, 
however, be categorised as ‘medical apps’ (Albrecht, Pramann, and von Jan 
2015, en8).
Thus, health apps are supposed to address healthy users to support a healthy 
lifestyle—while patients and professionals would probably rather use medi-
cal apps, for example, to cope with a chronic disease or for clinical decision 
support. App stores also distinguish between the two categories ‘health and 
fitness’ and ‘medicine’, but since the manufacturer decides which category 
the app is offered in, this does not necessarily correspond to the objective 
classification of the app (Kramer 2016; Free et al. 2010, 1).
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2.2 Applying the concept of nudging to health apps
Manipulative purposes and a lack of transparency are extremely important 
issues to be addressed when discussing the role of health apps in society. 
Thus, applying the concept of nudging to health apps requires a concretisa-
tion: nudging can take place on three levels.
First, using a health app is a kind of self-nudging: individuals use technology 
in order to lead a more self-determined and healthy life. This kind of self-nudg-
ing is different from other strategies such as self-binding behaviour, because 
self-binding is not liberty-preserving. Since it constitutes a commitment to a 
certain behaviour in the future, self-binding strategies trade future freedom of 
choice for certainty about one’s future behaviour.
By contrast, nudging is essentially defined through its libertarian element to 
retain individual freedom of choice. So, even in the case of self-nudging, the 
individual changes the choice architecture for future decisions but still decides 
in the future. If I use an app to remind me to go running, I can still decline 
every time I receive a reminder, but it probably helps me to go running more 
frequently and regularly. In this sense, a health app is a tool like a GPS that 
helps consumers to make good and efficient choices without undermining hu-
man agency (Sunstein 2015, 207). However, the two strategies have a common 
aim, namely to self-impose the attainment of higher order or meta-preferences 
and to defend oneself against human weaknesses of the will. Thus, health app 
users are becoming their own choice architect by choosing and personalising 
the health apps they use.
Second, as outlined below, health apps are private, largely unregulated goods 
that potentially influence users’ behaviour. Beyond self-nudging by a health 
app that reminds you to drink water, go running or take a medication, the 
app is used, but not developed, by the user. The supplied health apps differ 
in many respects, but there is a common feature, which is that they use the 
fact that we are social beings and nudge us by making comparisons with our 
previous health results or with the results of our peers. Health apps and, in 
particular, fitness apps nudge by comparison. This comparison is presented 
in a playful and competitive way. They have the potential to generate physical 
norms without a sound and transparent evidence base. Therefore, self-track-
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ing through the use of health apps, and self-quantification more generally, 
constitute a modern form of behavioural norm generated by individual health 
data (Kuhn 2014, 58) and based on commercially defined parameters and user 
surfaces. Thus, nudging in the context of apps is about nudging by commercial 
interests of the private sector selling specific apps to users. Those principally 
differing interests between those selling apps and those buying and using 
apps are not necessarily reconciled through market forces alone. As in many 
other areas where the invisible hand of the market is supposed to rule, there 
are attempts to regulate.
Protecting consumers against the commercial use of nudges constitutes a 
potential third level for nudging (Bruttel and Stolley 2014, 771): besides tra-
ditional forms of regulation such as prohibition or financial (dis-)incentives, 
public regulation could set defaults for the use of apps, such as labels signal-
ling important differences between apps to consumers and also differentiating 
between health apps and lifestyle apps. This would potentially constitute an 
important choice architecture for consumers.
3 Consumer protection
3.1 Status quo of health app market
The market for health apps is growing rapidly, including 231,000 apps in 2016 
within the categories ‘health and fitness’ and ‘medicine’ from the two leading 
app stores of iOS and Android, with a worldwide market revenue that reached 
approximately 12.5 billion US$ in 2016. Health apps predominantly focus on 
the chronically ill, persons interested in health and fitness, and physicians. 
The main revenue sources are services such as remote diagnosis based on 
submitted photos, and hardware sales such as specific medical devices de-
signed to be used with the app. In 2013 one-third of health apps were fit-
ness apps tracking fitness or guiding exercises. The second and third largest 
groups, each accounting for around 16 per cent, were apps providing medical 
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information and advice, for example, about symptoms, and wellness apps that 
give yoga instructions, for example. Nutrition apps that help to track diets or 
provide information about nutrition facts, and medical condition management 
apps represented the next largest groups of health app, each with a share 
of around 7 per cent. Medical condition management apps track and display 
health parameters or drug intake. In 2016 one-third of app manufacturers pre-
sumed that such apps would offer the greatest market potential over the next 
five years, along with diagnostic apps and remote monitoring apps (research-
2guidance 2014, 7–17; research2guidance 2016, 11–26).
Health apps offered by health insurance are of special interest. In a study of 
the Hannover Medical School from 2016, 60 health apps were identified, of-
fered by 29 of 127 different German statutory health insurers or their associ-
ations. Here, apps for health promotion and prevention—potentially nudging 
users towards a healthy lifestyle—formed the second largest group (20 apps). 
The authors only found one app that collected data within a bonus program. 
However, according to a survey of health insurance, which formed part of the 
study, three apps providing incentives within bonus programs were planned 
at this time. Only for one other app was it mentioned that the entered data was 
collected (Aumann, Pramann, and Frank 2016, 248–256).
3.2 Legal framework
Data use and protection is a particularly critical issue associated with health 
apps. According to § 284 of the Social Code Book V (SGB V), statutory health 
insurers have limited possibilities to survey and save the personal data of their 
insurees, and they are not allowed to create risk profiles of individual insurees. 
Thus, when offering health apps, they actually need an intermediary who anal-
yses and anonymises the collected data of an app for the health insurance. In 
general, data protection provisions of the Federal Data Protection Act (BDSG) 
have to be respected. Furthermore, apps that include fee-based services are 
also subject to the Telemedia Act (TMG), which determines the information ob-
ligations of the manufacturer, for example, in the form of an imprint (Pramann 
2016, 230–231).
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Moreover, in Germany medical apps are subject to the Act on Medical Devices 
(MPG) if they are medical products based on the legal preconditions described 
in § 3 (1) MPG. According to this provision, the manufacturer decides about the 
intended purpose of an app and thereby on its potential status as a medical 
product. Medical purposes are, for example, diagnosis, treatment of diseases, 
or investigation of a physical process—which could be realised by app features 
such as calculation of dosing of medicines, or monitoring patients and col-
lecting data, for example, using measurements. In other words, ‘any type of 
interference with data or information by the stand alone software is indicative 
of a classification as a medical device’ (BfArM 2015).
In case a medical purpose exists—according to the labelling, the instructions 
for use or the promotional material—a certification is mandatory in order to 
place them on the market and into operation. However, non-professional 
manufacturers are not always conscious of developing a medical product, and 
thus, do not always comply with the requirements. Apparently, the market for 
certified medical apps so far is small: in March 2016 HealthOn e.V. counted 10 
certified medical devices among German-language apps in the Google play 
store (Kramer 2016). However, the number of uncertified apps is probably high 
as a result of the unawareness and probably unwillingness of app manufac-
turers. The Guidance on Medical Apps published by the Federal Institute for 
Drugs and Medical Devices wants to provide orientation for manufacturers in 
terms of the clear classification of apps and with respect to the resulting legal 
consequences (Pramann 2016, 228–230; BfArM 2015).
3.3 Potential consumer protection measures
Obviously, health apps can be divided roughly in two groups, depending on 
whether or not they serve medical purposes. Consequently, this has to be tak-
en into account regarding the future need of consumer protection measures. 
With respect to medical apps, the real figures need to be explored, and accord-
ingly, the manufacturer’s compliance with respective laws and regulations. 
However, their risk classification also needs to be verified on the basis of an 
app’s security and its harm potential, such as false diagnoses (Pramann 2016, 
242; Albrecht, Pramann, and von Jan 2015, en8f).
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So far, the barrier to using health apps seems to have been low: most people 
use smartphones, the choice of apps is large, and the monetary and non-mon-
etary costs (such as installation and usability) are generally low. Hence, usage 
is intensifying and spreading, becoming a central aspect of contemporary so-
cial change. However, users are most likely not aware of the classification of 
health apps and the underlying conditions. The intended effects of the app 
use are important for them, but the unintended and maybe implicit effects are 
also relevant for consumer protection. Both medical and health apps pose a 
danger to the privacy and integrity of health-related data. Thus, any interfer-
ence with the data indicating the use of a medical device, as well as any form 
of choice architecture indicating the intention of nudging, should be visualised 
for consumers.
Unfortunately, user information enabling the evaluation of the personal ben-
efits and risks associated with an app is rarely available. Users usually inform 
themselves solely via user comments in app stores or blog posts, where little 
information is given on the reliability of the sources. The same applies to cer-
tificates that can be obtained from private initiatives. Moreover, the existing 
laws and regulations only apply to medical apps. Albrecht, Pramann and von 
Jan (2015) therefore propose that manufacturers provide information to us-
ers in a comprehensive and comprehensible way, for example, in the form of 
an app synopsis published directly in the app store and on their homepages. 
Moreover, as an easy usable tool they suggest a structured list with important 
points that users should take into account, such as the imprint of an app, a 
description of the intended purpose, the target audience, functionalities and 
their restrictions and limits (Albrecht, Pramann, and von Jan 2015, en7–10).
Nonetheless, this requires users with a higher degree of health literacy, or 
rather consumer competence, in order to understand the information provid-
ed. Moreover, the need and willingness to make the effort to evaluate an app 
probably exist for users of medical apps rather than users of health and fitness 
apps. The latter are designed to positively influence physical, mental and so-
cial well-being, and are therefore rather used by healthy people interested 
in their physical condition and in health promotion. They want to know more 
about their health parameters and search for motivation to stay on track with 
their fitness programmes—potential harm is less obvious than for medical 
apps. Thus, health app users are presumably less likely to search for consum-
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er information, although those apps bear at least the same danger as medical 
apps in terms of the privacy and integrity of the health-related data.
Health and fitness apps, however, pose a more implicit risk. The chance of 
nudging consumers towards healthy behaviour encompasses the positive 
side-effect of strengthening self-determination and individual responsibility. 
However, it also poses the risk of manipulating consumers and externally con-
trolling them, as well as fostering individualisation, in terms of not only in-
creased individual responsibility but also decreased solidarity within the stat-
utory health insurance. A YouGov study showed that 32 per cent of the German 
population can, in principle, imagine measuring health- and fitness-related 
data and sharing it with their health insurer in order to receive advantages 
(YouGov 2015). This is consistent with a study conducted by the Hannover Med-
ical School, which found indications that apps offered by health insurers, es-
pecially within bonus programmes, will gain importance (Aumann, Pramann, 
and Frank 2016). However, advantages for healthy people can in turn be seen 
as disadvantages for less healthy people who are not able to receive such bo-
nuses. Moreover, bonuses can only be achieved when insurees accept the use 
of health apps and the sharing of their health data. This might put pressure 
on insurees to use such technologies. Finally, the use of such technologies 
facilitates the comparison of health-related data and might increase the so-
cial pressure to be healthy, or rather, to prove one is living a healthy lifestyle. 
However, eHealth literacy, which is defined as ‘the ability to seek, find, un-
derstand, and appraise health information from electronic sources and apply 
the knowledge gained to addressing or solving a health problem’ (Norman 
and Skinner 2006, 2), is lower for patients with chronic conditions, perhaps 
because of their older age and lower socio-economic status (Fox 2007; Paige 
et al. 2017, 320).
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4 Conclusion
Against this background, providing more and better consumer information is 
warranted but not sufficient. A broader debate is required, discussing the role 
of consumers, the government and health insurers in the regulation of health 
apps. Health apps constitute a nudge. If it is left to commercial nudging, the 
societal implications are unforeseeable. In order to put consumer interests in 
the driver’s seat of technological progress, we need statutory health insurers 
and governments to be at the centre of regulation, using conventional instru-
ments and nudges as regulatory tools.
To this end, we need a better empirical understanding of health app user be-
haviour. Empirical research suggests that whether health apps are viewed as 
empowering self-nudging tools or as manipulative and controlling consumers 
depends on the individual consumer (Böning and Maier-Rigaud forthcoming). 
Based on Riesman’s classic distinction between inner-directedness and oth-
er-directedness, one hypothesis that needs to be tested is whether we find 
distinctive user types who need different consumer protection measures in the 
realm of health apps. Our intuition suggests that in our digital world of social 
media, smartphones and health apps, the other-directed type of consumer, 
as described by Riesman (1961/2001, 21) in The Lonely Crowd, has become 
dominant in our society and is highly vulnerable: ‘What is common to all the 
other-directed people is that their contemporaries are the source of direction 
for the individual—either those known to him or those with whom he is indi-
rectly acquainted, through friends and through the mass media.’
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